Are Mechanisms of Substitute Votes a Suitable Means of Solving Certain Problems Associated with Electoral Systems of Proportional Representation?

Mixed-member proportional systems like that of Germany attempt to combine two objectives, namely linking the basic principles of proportional representation with a mechanism of personal voting for candidates in constituencies. This inevitably leads to conflicts between different aims, as can be seen particularly clearly in the reform of the German electoral system in 2023. In order to achieve the goals of proportionality and compliance with the target size of parliament, the principle of second vote coverage of constituency seats was implemented, according to which each party in a federal state receives a maximum number of constituency seats proportional to its second votes there. One consequence of this is the creation of so-called orphaned constituencies, which do not have a directly elected representative in the Bundestag. This result has attracted a great deal of criticism. One possible solution to this problem could be a substitute vote mechanism for the election of constituency candidates, as it was already discussed by the German Bundestag's electoral reform commission. Substitute votes are also being discussed in Germany in connection with the 5% threshold clause. In order to avoid so-called “wasted votes,” voters should be able to indicate a substitute choice on their party vote in case their first-choice party fails to meet the threshold clause. The presentation discusses these substitute voting mechanisms in terms of their consequences for political representation, the strategic incentives they create (or eliminate), and, above all, their impact on the acceptance of such reform measures.