When Do Disruption and Violence Lead to Concessions for Marginalized Groups?

A substantial body of research in political violence and contentious politics emphasizes the limits and risks of violence as a strategy for making claims against the state, often highlighting its strategic drawbacks, especially the tendency to undermine public support when compared to nonviolent protest. This paper qualifies that view by developing one specific causal mechanism linking violence to concessions by the state. More specifically, it outlines conditions under which violence, when embedded in disruptive collective action, can lead to substantial concessions for marginalized groups in electoral democracies. When marginalized challengers impose major disruptions — such as occupations or blockades — and defend them with a degree of militancy that cannot be easily dismantled, governments face a dilemma: repress at the risk of public backlash, or negotiate to restore order. Violence becomes politically effective not through coercive capacity alone, but through its interaction with disruption, media attention, public opinion, and electoral incentives. In other words, I argue that disruption defended by violence can succeed when governments face high electoral costs of repression, and when challengers are able to frame both their grievances and their militancy as legitimate in the eyes of the public. The argument is illustrated through in-depth process tracing of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in Mexico. Drawing on primary sources, media coverage, opinion data, and elite statements, the analysis shows how the Zapatistas combined armed disruption with discursive strategies that resonated with widely shared concerns about democracy, inequality, and political exclusion. This combination constrained the government’s repressive options, induced negotiations, and resulted in both short-term concessions and longer-term political consequences, including electoral reforms and de facto autonomy for Zapatista communities. To assess the broader plausibility of the proposed mechanism, the paper conducts a controlled comparison with six additional cases that are similar in background conditions but vary in levels of militancy, disruption, discursive power, and goal difficulty. The comparison shows that violence is neither sufficient nor necessary for success, but that concessions are most likely when disruption, militancy, and discursive power are jointly present and aligned with electoral timing. By specifying when and how violence can contribute to political concessions in electoral democracies, the paper contributes to research on political violence, contentious politics, and democratic accountability. It clarifies the conditions under which states transform violent contention into negotiated political change, and advances debates on radical flank effects and the outcomes of armed resistance.