Addressing the Empirical–Normative Divide in Systemic Representation Theory

The normative–empirical divide has long been discussed in the literature on political representation (Achen; Mansbridge; Sabl). Although this divide has been narrowed in work on dyadic representation (Mansbridge; Rehfeld; Disch), it remains prominent in systemic approaches. Empirical work tends to conceive systemic representation as unitary, focusing on the representation produced by the political system as a whole, mainly through formal institutions and policy responsiveness, in part for methodological reasons (Sabl). Normative theory, by contrast, understands systemic representation as the aggregation of multiple representative instances, extends representation beyond formal institutions, and evaluates it using broader criteria such as inclusion and deliberation. While many empirical scholars acknowledge the limits of responsiveness as a normative standard, these alternative criteria are rarely incorporated into empirical analysis. I address this gap by examining the normative value of policy responsiveness itself, arguing that policy responsiveness, taken on its own, has little normative value. From a normative perspective, systems of representation should be responsive not to individual policy preferences as such, but to collectively formed public reasons and arguments. Whether responsiveness is normatively desirable therefore depends on the extent to which public opinion is supported by deliberation; moreover, beyond citizens’ individual policy preferences, a representative system must be responsive to the intensity of those preferences and to the interests of non-enfranchised constituencies, including future generations, non-human animals, nature, and non-citizens.