Violence Before the Vote: Structuring Electoral Competition in Colombia

Subnational undemocratic regimes can persist within formally democratic states when local elections and checks and balances are systematically undermined, particularly in decentralized political systems. Existing theory emphasizes that such regimes are sustained not only through institutional manipulation but also through violent practices that shape who can compete, mobilize, and participate politically. Yet empirical evidence linking political violence to observable electoral dynamics at the local level remains limited, especially over time. We examine this relationship in Colombia, where decentralized authority and high municipal dependence on national transfers create strong incentives for incumbent mayors to entrench local political control. Drawing on data on violence directed at electoral candidates and local political actors, we analyse municipal mayoral and council elections in 2019 and 2023. Using a difference-in-differences design, we assess how targeted violence is associated with voter turnout and electoral margins. We find that municipalities experiencing violence against political opponents exhibit lower voter turnout and larger incumbent victory margins relative to comparable municipalities without such targeting. Importantly, these electoral patterns persist across elections, indicating that the consequences of violence are not confined to a single electoral contest. The findings are consistent with theoretical accounts of subnational undemocratic regimes in which violence narrows political participation and electoral competition while formal electoral institutions remain intact. By documenting the persistence of violence-associated electoral dynamics across multiple electoral cycles, the paper contributes to debates on democratic erosion by clarifying how violent political control is maintained at the local level within national democracies.