Employers’ Associations in Noisy Politics: Labor Migration Policy in German and Dutch Agriculture

Over the past decade, labor shortages have intensified across European Union (EU) member states, reaching record levels in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the late 1990s, labor migration from outside the EU has been promoted by governments and employers as a relatively quick and inexpensive response to these shortages. Yet this policy option has become increasingly politically contentious amid xenophobic public opinion and the electoral success of far-right parties. Despite facing similar structural labor market pressures, EU member states vary considerably in their policy responses. This paper examines why some countries adopt more liberal labor migration policy outputs than others by focusing on political salience and the role of employers’ associations in labor migration policymaking in the agricultural sectors of Germany and the Netherlands. The paper argues that the extent to which labor migration is perceived as politically salient conditions how employers’ associations engage with policymakers, ultimately shaping migration policy outputs. Where migration is highly politicized, employers adjust not only the content but also the visibility of their lobbying strategies, with important consequences for policy change. The paper asks: How does political salience shape employers’ associations’ lobbying strategies on labor migration, and what consequences does this have for national policy outcomes? Empirically, the paper adopts a comparative case study design using a most-similar systems approach. Germany and the Netherlands are both coordinated market economies with comparable labor market institutions, industrial relations systems, and migration histories. The analysis focuses on the agricultural sector, which faces acute and similar demand for seasonal labor in both countries and has been particularly affected by declining labor inflows from Eastern EU member states. Despite these similarities, the two countries display divergent policy outcomes: Germany has introduced new bilateral seasonal labor agreements with non-EU countries, while the Netherlands has largely maintained its existing, largely restrictive policy framework. The study draws on qualitative analysis of 120 policy documents and 20 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, including representatives of employers’ associations, trade unions, and public officials. The findings show that employers’ associations remain actively engaged in lobbying for labor migration even under conditions of high political salience, challenging claims that business influence is confined to “quiet” politics. However, their strategies differ markedly across contexts. German agricultural employers’ associations have pursued a proactive and public lobbying strategy, openly advocating expanded access to third-country workers and contributing to policy liberalization. By contrast, Dutch employers’ associations have adopted a more defensive approach, refraining from explicit demands for new migration pathways and instead prioritizing the preservation of existing access to predominantly intra-EU migrant labor. This variation is explained by nationally distinct patterns of migration politicization, which shape employers’ perceptions of political opportunity structures. By showing how employers interpret and respond to political salience in this specific case of labor migration, the paper contributes to debates around interest group politics, political salience, and the social partners.