Political Capacity in Hybrid Offices: Technical-Political Governance Tasks in Central Executives

The Weberian model of rational-legal bureaucracy has long been the gold standard for evaluating state capacity. Within this framework, a high-quality bureaucracy is typically understood as a non-political one—characterized by merit-based recruitment, technical expertise, procedural adherence, and detachment from politics. However, the conventional division of labor between bureaucrats and politicians, combined with an overemphasis on recruitment methods, has limited our understanding of how top-level administrations function internally, particularly in regions where patronage is widespread, such as Latin America. These states have grown increasingly complex, not only in size but also in their political dynamics, including fragmented coalitions that require power-sharing, multi-level governance, and rising societal demands for political participation. Despite these trends, little is known about the nature of technical-political governance tasks performed by top executives. This paper seeks to address that gap by asking: what constitutes technical-political governance, and how does it contribute to state capacity? I propose opening the "black box" of top administration to deepen our understanding of the political dimension of state capacity—the "political capacity." To do this, we must first conceptualize and analyze the formal and informal features that define this level of governance—the "office." Here, office is understood not as a specific department or bureaucratic entity, but as a distinct life order that organizes the work of top-level bureaucracies. This research focuses on such offices within the institutional contexts of Latin American countries. Thus, first, I characterize the higher office of central executives—populated mainly by political appointees. Empirically, the study draws on a grounded theory case study of Brazil, employing a combination of in-depth interviews and direct shadowing of top-level political appointees. The goal is to deconstruct the process of building political capacity within executive governance, moving beyond the traditional technical-political divide. The research identifies eight core technical-political governance tasks regularly performed within the top executive office: leveraging (quiet and public), policy calibration, political refereeing, playfield cultivation, shielding (both principals and civil servants), advocating (internal and external), upward agenda-building, and purpose-building. These tasks are organized into five key role sets: (i) policy building, (ii) external stakeholder management, (iii) ministerial advisory, (iv) internal management, and (v) intragovernmental management. I analyze these governance tasks in terms of their content, nature, and the forms of interaction they require. This research offers a significant contribution to the field of executive politics in multiparty presidential systems. By shifting the focus from how political appointees are selected to how they work, I propose an "office approach" for the study of top-level bureaucracies. Understanding the demands and practices of these roles is essential for navigating contemporary governance challenges, such as political fragmentation, limited state capacities, external pressures, expanding citizen participation, and the pressing need for effective public policies to mitigate deep-seated inequalities. Ultimately, in politically contentious environments, the successful implementation of public policy depends not only on financial and infrastructural resources but also on building the political viability of policy solutions. This political management dimension shapes the higher office regarding the governance tasks that must be performed.