Rhetorical Attacks as External Determinants of Judicial Behavior

(For Panel 5 - Off-bench judicial politics: External determinants of judicial behaviour and outcomes) The first decades of the twenty-first century have been marked by a global rise in autocratic tendencies and democratic backsliding. Across different analytical frameworks, the expansion of executive power has emerged as a defining feature of new authoritarian regimes. Rather than abrupt democratic breakdowns, scholars emphasize gradual processes of autocratization that unfold under the guise of legality, often through institutional and legal reforms. Within this literature, the erosion of judicial independence has been identified as a central mechanism through which executives consolidate power. Existing research on judicial backsliding has primarily focused on formal and internal mechanisms of control, such as changes in judicial appointment and promotion procedures, legislative reforms aimed at influencing court decisions, and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors. This paper shifts attention to an underexplored external determinant of judicial behavior: executive rhetoric. It argues that public speeches and statements by political leaders constitute a powerful informal mechanism through which executives seek to pressure courts, shape public opinion, and undermine judicial autonomy without direct legal intervention. Focusing on Turkey as a paradigmatic case of competitive authoritarianism, the paper examines executive rhetorical attacks on the judiciary under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Empirically, it analyzes President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speeches and public statements concerning the Gezi Park trial (2019-2022), a highly politicized and symbolically significant case in Turkey’s recent history. Using qualitative discourse analysis, the study investigates how executive rhetoric frames judicial actors and proceedings, delegitimizes defendants, and constructs narratives of threat, morality, and popular sovereignty. Particular attention is paid to the discursive strategies through which the executive frames itself as a guardian of the “national will” while simultaneously applying subtle pressure on, or implicitly threatening, courts and judges. By demonstrating how executive rhetoric operates as an informal network of influence surrounding courts, the paper contributes to judicial politics research beyond its traditional focus on internal judicial factors. It shows how rhetorical attacks can erode public trust in judicial institutions, normalize executive interference, and pose real and immediate threats to judicial independence. More broadly, these dynamics illustrate that rhetorical attacks on courts constitute a generalized and increasingly common form of informal executive pressure, shaping judicial behavior and public perceptions of the judiciary across different political contexts.