The Politics of De-Risking: Explaining Variation in Strategic Responses to Weaponized Interdependence

As powerful states increasingly weaponize economic interdependence, vulnerable actors adopt "derisking" strategies to mitigate coercion risks while maintaining connectivity. This paper develops a network-structural theory explaining variation in de-risking responses across states and sectors. We argue strategic choices depend on two factors: network tie properties (discrete versus continuous) determining threat types (exclusion versus intrusion), and the availability of structurally equivalent, homophilous alternative partners. When ties are continuous and enable surveillance, vulnerable states prioritize regulatory measures against intrusion threats; when discrete, capacity-building addresses exclusion risks. Diversification feasibility depends on viable substitutes sharing institutional preferences. We probe this argument using eight case studies varying across policy fields, goods types, network structures, and actors. Four cases center on the EU and actors of varying size and geoeconomic position, ranging from EU critical raw materials de-risking to Singapore's water supply diversification. Our paper reveals how network topology systematically shapes economic security strategies beyond binary decoupling-integration debates.