Authoritarian Presidentialism: The Toolkit of Authoritarian Constitutional Customization

After gaining independence, the post-Soviet republics such as Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics initially limited presidential terms to two, each ranging between 4 to 5 years. However, from the early 2000s onward, several former republics, primarily through referenda, amended their constitutions to extend their terms. Despite variations in governance structures, the institution of the presidency became the central political institution across the region. This paper examines the mechanisms and circumstances that have fostered the development of authoritarian presidentialism and inhibited the evolution of constitutional presidentialism in Central Asia, Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan We develop a repertoire of practices including zeroing term limits, introducing the concept of the “Leader of the Nation,” extending term limits, establishment of Security Councils, strengthening of National Guard units and temporary transfer of power, all of which are used to extend presidential power and legitimize authoritarian rule. We analyze the extent to which these practices are adopted as part of a process of authoritarian learning, either as a result of the collapse or destabilization of neighboring regimes or to emulate the models adopted by other regimes in an effort to protect regime security.