Authoritarian adaptation: Constitutional Reform and Dominant Party Rule in Armenia and Georgia

This article examines whether and how transitions from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism in hybrid regimes may function as strategies of authoritarian adaptation under conditions that constrain overt term-limit evasion. Focusing on Armenia and Georgia, the study combines a comparative contextual analysis of stakes and constraints surrounding executive exit with a qualitative analysis of how constitutional reforms were justified and implemented. The findings show that reforms were framed in democratic and parliamentary terms while simultaneously reducing presidential autonomy and strengthening executive authority anchored in dominant parliamentary parties. However, the trajectories diverged substantially after reform. In Armenia, the Velvet Revolution disrupted incumbent attempts at power preservation and opened space for greater political competition. In Georgia, parliamentarization became intertwined with dominant-party consolidation and increasing informal political control surrounding Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili. The study highlights the importance of analyzing formal constitutional change together with informal power structures in hybrid regimes.