Integrated or Coercive? Typologies of Rebel Consolidation in Post-Assad Syria

Syria’s transition after the fall of the Assad regime presents a puzzle: the same authorities that pursued international rehabilitation and institutional incorporation of rivals also presided over episodes of extreme identity-based violence. This article argues that the apparent contradiction reflects a consolidation logic specific to fractured rebel victories. I develop a typology of short-term rebel consolidation that crosses coalition unity with the dominant instrument of rule, generating four trajectories: integrated hegemony, coercive hegemony, fragile coalition, and warlord anarchy. Syria’s post-December 2024 order begins from a fractured-victor configuration and therefore tends toward a dual-track strategy. The mechanism is a threat–opportunity calculus: actors judged flexible partners are selectively co-opted through formal integration and participatory institutions to reduce fragmentation and unlock external resources, while actors judged irreconcilable threats are met with coercion to pre-empt vetoes over centralisation. Tracing early consolidation episodes, including stalled bargaining with the SDF and major bouts of coastal and southern violence, shows that “peace” and repression can be jointly produced by the same state-building project.