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Do Minipublics Enhance Effective Democratic Decision-Making? Evidence from Climate Assemblies

Comparative Politics
Democracy
Climate Change
Policy-Making
Janosch Pfeffer
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg
Janosch Pfeffer
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg

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Abstract

Democracies face structural barriers to effective decision-making on long-term and contested issues. Climate change is a paradigmatic case where electoral incentives, partisan competition, and media pressures often discourage ambitious and effective action. Minipublics, such as citizens’ assemblies, promise to enhance democratic capacity for effective decision-making because they allow informed deliberation shielded from electoral pressures. This framework paper asks whether and under what conditions citizens’ assemblies fulfill this promise by synthesizing four empirical and one theoretical article on climate citizens’ assemblies. To interpret the articles’ findings, the paper integrates perspectives from public policy, public choice, and normative theory conceptualizing effective decision-making. The findings show that climate assemblies consistently proposed more ambitious climate policies than governments. Their endorsements can increase public support for unpopular policies, though not more than endorsements from other trusted actors. Receiving more information about minipublics slightly increases their perceived credibility and persuasiveness. Assembly recommendations had causal impact on decision-making by shifting power balances and accelerating action, but this has been the exception. In most cases, they had no such impact. Meaningful impact occurred mainly where political leaders delegated authority and actively supported the process. Overall, climate assemblies can counteract some perverse incentives in democratic decision-making but also serve as window-dressers. Their impact is highly conditional. Political context and leadership may matter more than design alone. Citizens’ assemblies therefore offer limited but real potential to strengthen effective democratic decision-making. The central question that emerges is how minipublics can be made less dependent on the will of elected politicians, who remain constrained by enduring systemic pressures.