Unlocking Litigation as Political Influence: A Multi-Venue Perspective on Corporate Lobbying

Strategic litigation rarely occurs in a vacuum. This paper analytically and empirically explores litigation as part of a broader EU advocacy toolkit, built on the premise that interest groups in the EU combine multiple advocacy channels—including public communication, lobbying, and litigation—to optimise their chances of success. It focuses in particular on the interplay between litigation and political lobbying by one type of interest group actor: the corporate “multi-venue player”. Based on two qualitative case studies in EU intellectual property and climate policy, the paper unpacks how litigation and lobbying operate as interdependent actions in a multi-venue advocacy game across judicial, political, and public arenas aimed at securing business profitability. Drawing on elite interviews and qualitative case law analysis, it examines how litigation strategies are designed, by which constellations of actors—firms and associations—and how these strategies feed into political arenas. The paper shows that corporate litigation in EU law may be integrated into wider advocacy campaigns in at least two key ways. First, litigation can trigger follow-through lobbying strategies aimed at mobilising other market players or increasing issue salience at early stages of the policy cycle. Second, even when judicial success is unlikely, litigation may be deployed as a form of political signalling, pressure, or technical argumentation in political arenas. The analysis further highlights the multi-level dynamics at play, exploring the role of Member States as potential facilitating actors in corporate multi-venue strategies. Ultimately, the findings demonstrate the instrumental value of EU litigation across the policy cycle, challenging its conventional framing as a last-resort mechanism deployed only once lobbying has concluded. By expanding the advocacy toolkit and conceptualising litigation as a central component of multi-venue lobbying strategies, the paper contributes to debates on the limits of strategic litigation, corporate political activity, and lobbying strategies shaping EU policymaking.