Mobilizing Firms: How Protest Movements Drive Lobbying Efforts

Large firms employ sophisticated public relations strategies in response to media-reported protests that might affect their business reputation and revenue. This research argues that they apply equally strategic approaches to political engagement, reacting dynamically to outsider political pressure that media transmit to re-election-focused lawmakers. Firms anticipate that mounting pressure may prompt lawmakers to reshuffle their agendas to signal responsiveness to outsiders. When this restricts firms' domestic political space and freedom of maneuver, they register to access new political venues in multi-level systems like the European Union to counterbalance reduced access at home. While resource allocation to political representation primarily depends on financial capacity, this equilibrium shifts dynamically when firms' preferred level of protection is no longer guaranteed by equal political access in domestic venues. I test this framework using granular temporal data on lobbying firms within the European Parliament and Commission, classifying public demonstrations on a left-right, pro-anti state intervention ideological spectrum. Results show that intensified left-aligned protests (pro-state intervention) significantly accelerate the timing of corporate political mobilization in Brussels, while right-wing protests (anti-state intervention) delay corporate registration. Both effects are most pronounced among smaller firms at the edge of political participation. These findings underscore public opinion's critical influence on corporate political behavior, suggesting that the window for effective policy intervention may be narrower than previously recognized.