Strategic Framing of Judicial Authority in Party Politics: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal

During the last decade, political parties in both the United States and Poland have increasingly used the judiciary as a central element of their political strategy. In the U.S., the appointment of three Supreme Court justices under the Trump administration shifted the Court’s ideological balance, generating intense public debate over its role in shaping policy outcomes. In Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) has framed the Constitutional Tribunal as both a tool and a site of political contestation, particularly following reforms in 2015 that provoked protests and international attention. This paper examines how parties in these contexts strategically frame judicial authority to advance their political goals. Drawing on theories of politicization of justice and institutionalism, it argues that courts are not neutral arbiters but politically salient institutions, with institutional design and historical legacies shaping how parties mobilize supporters and challenge opponents. The comparison highlights contrasts: the U.S. has a long-established, institutionalized judiciary, while Poland’s Tribunal operates in a post-communist context marked by intense political contestation. The study proceeds in three parts. First, it conceptualizes courts as strategic actors in political discourse, whose authority is shaped and contested through both formal institutional rules and partisan rhetoric. Second, a content analysis of speeches, manifestos, and press releases identifies frames such as “guardian of democracy,” “obstacle,” and “partisan tool,” revealing how parties signal their ideological positions and craft messages around institutional legitimacy. Third, a cross-national comparison highlights how institutional design, historical context, and party competition influence the political impact of judicial framing, shaping inter-party conflict as well as public perceptions of legitimacy. Methodologically, the study combines qualitative coding with quantitative frame analysis to track the strategic use of courts in party discourse. Using a comparative perspective, the paper illustrates how parties actively construct judicial power to achieve political objectives, offering insights into the politicization of courts in both established and transitional democracies.