The Rise of Defensive Democracies in Eastern Europe. How the Rising Geopolitical Tensions May Strengthen, Not Weaken, Democracy

So far, scholars have analysed democracy and democratic self-defence predominantly in domestic political settings, while developing the notion of militant democracy and related concepts (Malkopoulou & Kirshner, 2021). However, the rising geopolitical tensions, the "New Cold War", and the age of "Neo-imperialism", which have been inaugurated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump's presidency, are compelling researchers to consider also the geopolitical dimension of threats to democracy. Against this backdrop, the paper proposes a new concept – "defensive democracy". It defines defensive democracy as an emerging form of contemporary democracy that prioritises existential and national security over democratic rights and liberties, while still adhering to democracy's core principles. At its core, the doctrine holds that, to preserve the country's existence and the democratic system, it may be necessary to curtail certain democratic freedoms and rights on occasion. Moreover, the paper states that defensive democracy has three distinct traits. First, in defensive democracies, core freedoms and rights are safeguarded for most citizens; however, special restrictions may be imposed on specific societal groups (e.g, ethnic minorities) for national security reasons. Second, under defensive democracy, the very existence of the country and its democratic order is depicted as constantly under threat, and the securitisation of various policy areas and societal domains gradually becomes the new normal. Third, in the public discourse, individuals are often divided into patriotic citizens, "suspicious citizens", and outright enemies. Historically, the prime example of a defensive democracy has been Israel. However, we are now witnessing the gradual emergence of defensive democracies across Eastern Europe, particularly in countries threatened by Russia. The paper will concentrate predominantly on the Baltic States, for which all three traits of defensive democracy outlined above will be analysed in depth. The Baltic States are treated as a laboratory case because they border Russia, having a large Russian minority, for which the war in Ukraine has already led to various restrictions on some of their democratic freedoms. The depth analysis of the Baltic States will reveal a paradox of defensive democracy. On the one hand, while considering the above-mentioned features of defensive democracy (restrictions on minority rights, securitisation of various policy areas, and polarising discourses on national security), one can assume the deterioration of the quality of democracy. However, the Baltic States prove the opposite: according to the V-Dem and Freedom House scores, they are still among the strongest liberal democracies in the CEE, surpassing considerably less-defensive-democracy-like Hungary and Slovakia. The paper will further explore that paradox while demonstrating that various domestic developments and the Baltic elites' strong willingness to retain liberalism to ensure strong international support for their countries have produced a situation in which liberal democratic values have thrived rather than weakened under defensive democracy. Overall, the paper is trying to make a conceptual innovation in "democratic imagery", follows the interdisciplinary approach and demonstrates democracies' adaptive capacity in the midst of contemporary crises.