Why Are Separatist Parties More Successful in Some Regions? A Relative Deprivation Perspective

Why do some regions seek independence while others remain content within the state they belong to? A longstanding debate in the study of separatism focuses on whether nations without a state mobilise for secession because they are economically disadvantaged and feel left behind, or because they are relatively affluent and seek greater fiscal and political autonomy to capitalise on their wealth. While relative deprivation theory has been widely used to explain protest behaviour and other forms of political mobilisation, its application to separatism remains theoretically fragmented and largely confined to single-case studies, leaving the bigger picture behind. In particular, there is still no systematic framework linking perceptions of economic disadvantage—or advantage—to the electoral success of separatist parties. This paper argues that individuals assess their region’s economic standing in relative terms, comparing it specifically to the capital region, which often embodies political power and economic centrality. We contend that perceived regional relative deprivation vis-à-vis the capital increases support for separatist parties. To test this claim, we compare 20 regions across Western democracies where separatist movements are present, examining whether relative deprivation helps explain variation in the electoral success of separatism. Preliminary results indicate that relative deprivation is a statistically significant predictor of separatist success in some regions, but not in others, suggesting that economic grievances interact with broader regional and institutional contexts. By reframing economic explanations of separatism around relative comparisons with the capital, this study contributes to the political economy of secession and helps reconcile competing claims about whether separatism is driven by poverty, prosperity, or perceived injustice.