A Democratic Case for the Legitimacy of Populist Governments

A Democratic Case for the Legitimacy of Populist Governments Populist governments are often criticized for their manipulation of the information environment, which significantly shapes individuals’ perceptions of governmental legitimacy. Given that electoral processes can be distorted by manipulative practices employed by populist leaders such as Erdoğan, Trump, and Orbán, it is easy to question the legitimacy of these regimes and to call for NGOs with transnational connections to support democratic forces within these countries. While I do not disagree with such critiques of populist leaders, I remain unconvinced that their legitimacy can be dismissed so easily. Legitimacy, unlike democracy, is not an inherently "thick" concept. It is often easier to identify governments that are legitimate but undemocratic than those that are democratic but illegitimate. Thus, it would be misleading to assume that all legitimate governments must be democratic. Otherwise, we would be forced to conclude that the vast majority of the world’s population lives under the authority of illegitimate regimes, a conclusion that seems untenable. This paper employs Raz’s service conception of authority to outline the normative conditions under which a populist government can exercise legitimate authority over its citizens. In doing so, it proposes treating democratic elections as a mechanism for assessing legitimacy, enabling citizens to evaluate the performance of their government and replace it if dissatisfied with its services. Consequently, the paper argues that electoral democracy is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for political legitimacy, given that it is the most widely recognized mechanism for evaluating authority within contemporary political systems. It is evident that populist leaders often gain power through democratic electoral processes. However, their legitimacy is frequently questioned due to accusations that they undermine the very institutional frameworks and electoral systems that allowed them to assume power. This critique creates a dichotomy between well-functioning institutional mechanisms and the anti-institutionalist tendencies of populist leaders. I contend, however, that this dichotomy is more complex than it is typically portrayed. Populist governments can be deemed legitimacy when they succesfully present themselves as the most effective service providers for their electorates. And they do so often by benefiting from the failure of previous governments and the mistrust that citizens have towards alternative authorities. Furthermore, populist leaders derive additional legitimacy from their ability to connect with citizens on an emotional level. Their anti-institutionalist rhetoric often resonates emotionally with individuals, bolstered by the leaders’ personal charisma. This "affectual" dimension frequently complements rational policy-making in populist administrations, granting them an electoral advantage in the contemporary era of mass digital democracy. This is one of the reason why no government can neither stay in the power nor remain legitimate unless it holds its promises and delivers services to its citizens.