The EU’s drive toward strategic autonomy, particularly in the critical domains of economic security and trade, has brought long‑term debates about its internal cohesion and enduring East‑West divide to the forefront. This agenda, centered on de‑risking external dependencies and bolstering institutional resilience, creates a complex landscape of friction and opportunity for Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states. As they reassess their influence within the EU’s evolving architecture, these states navigate between aligning with broader EU priorities and defending distinct national interests. This paper contends that the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have strategically positioned themselves as a pivotal vanguard in this process, actively shaping the EU’s emerging anti‑coercion toolkit. Consequently, they have played an instrumental role in anchoring the EU’s approach to China within a stringent, security‑focused framework. By examining coalition patterns and diplomatic initiatives since 2020, this analysis explores how these states leverage their unique geopolitical perspective to influence the strategic autonomy shift, thereby recalibrating traditional dependencies and solidarities between CEE and Western member states.
This paper identifies a deliberate Baltic pivot from past engagement toward a strategy of ‘selective disentanglement’ with China. This reorientation is deeply interwoven with the EU’s own evolving securitization of economic policy. The analysis focuses on two pivotal empirical developments that exemplify this shift. First is the coordinated trilateral withdrawal from the China–CEEC cooperation framework after 2021, a decisive move that undermined a key platform for Beijing’s divisive outreach in the CEE region. Second is Lithuania’s deepening of relations with Taiwan, a policy that triggered a severe coercive campaign from Beijing. This latter case proved particularly consequential, as it successfully transformed a national‑level dispute into a definitive test of EU‑wide solidarity. The resulting crisis forced Brussels to operationalize its rhetorical commitments, testing and actively molding the EU’s nascent collective response mechanisms against economic coercion.
Developing a two‑level account of agency, this paper argues that Baltic governments astutely navigate this terrain by reconciling domestic demands for a values‑based foreign policy with the conscious mobilization of transnational EU solidarity to mitigate risks born of asymmetric interdependence. Comparative observation across the CEE region reveals a spectrum of caution, with many governments favoring incremental adjustment. In contrast, Lithuania’s experience has demonstrably widened the perceived scope for more openly security‑oriented and values‑driven China policies within the EU, setting a powerful precedent.
In conclusion, this paper sketches future scenarios—such as escalating tensions over Taiwan or disputes concerning critical technology supply chains—where the EU’s anti‑coercion instruments will likely face renewed tests. It proposes indicators to assess whether subsequent EU collective action constitutes credible deterrence or remains merely reactive symbolism. Ultimately, it considers whether the Baltic example suggests a broader regional shift toward institutionalized resilience, illuminating how the contested pursuit of strategic autonomy is fundamentally reconfiguring political hierarchies, dependencies, and solidarities between the EU’s East and West.
