As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, Ukrainian surrender of territories captured by Russia remains a central sticking point of the “peace plan” orchestrated by the Kremlin and Donald Trump. The idea is firmly rejected by a majority of Ukrainians, while citizens in the West, in general, continue to show high levels of support for Ukraine, as opposed to Russia. A recent snap poll conducted by More in Common (December 2025) finds that a majority of respondents in Britain, Poland, and France, and a plurality of respondents in the US and Germany, believe that Ukrainian territorial concessions are an unacceptable condition of any peace deal and would reward a bellicose Russia that will invariably attempt to invade other European states. European citizens, especially those living in countries with close proximity to Russia, are rightly worried that any concessions will set a terrible precedent, fueling Russian revanchism. And yet, even in European states, pro-Russian attitudes persist amongst supporters of radical-right and, at times, radical-left, parties, both of which are the direct beneficiaries of the Kremlin’s financial largesse and who share Putin’s resentment for the EU and liberal democracy. Despite the proliferation of public opinion polling on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, few studies have yet to empirically analyze why individuals support one side over the other, especially when it comes to territorial concessions. We remedy this gap with an analysis of novel survey data collected after the Russian invasion in nine countries: France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Canada, and the US. First, drawing on previous studies that examine the types of narratives surrounding the conflict that dominate the media sphere, we examine whether country-specific representations of Ukraine result in more or less country-wide support for territorial concessions. We show that there is indeed country variation; countries where a more Russia-critical media environment exists (Poland, France, the US) produce citizens who are more opposed to concessions than countries where the media is Russia-friendly (Hungary, Italy). Second, we evaluate the individual-level factors that drive support for territorial concessions, including partisanship, ideological orientations, Euroscepticism, and populism. Preliminary findings point to the primacy of euroscepticism as the strongest predictor of support for concessions, even in the US and Canada. Third, we use this paper as an opportunity to examine how attitudes towards territorial concessions in Ukraine map onto a second on-going conflict in Gaza in four countries: Spain, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden. While the internal logics of the two conflicts are distinct, both invoke considerations of international norms and territorial sovereignty, and are both subject to conflict framing in the media. On the one hand, respondents who support Ukrainian concessions may express support for Israel, viewing Israel as “the rightful owner” of Gaza, thereby signaling support for Russia. On the other, accepting the idea of concessions may translate into greater support for Palestine, as these two positions align among radical-left ideologues that are hostile to Western imperialism. Interestingly, we find that opposition to concessions translates broadly into support for Israel.
