Geopolitical Orientations in the Baltic States: A Person-Oriented Approach

The Russian attack on Ukraine sent shockwaves throughout the Baltic countries, which for years had been warning against Russian revanchism and aggression. The Baltic states moved to the centre-stage as a potential new hotspot in the increasingly visible geopolitical contest between Europe and Russia. The external threat posed by Russia has even accentuated domestic tensions related to belonging, citizenship, language rights and integration, i.e. tensions between the ethno-lingual majority and minority groups. While some have warned against the largely Soviet era Russophone minorities as a potential security risk, others have emphasised that there is a marked difference between speaking Russian and supporting Putin and the brutal war in Ukraine. Conversely, although it seems plausible to assume that most ethnic Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are strongly anti-Putin and even anti-Russia, the picture might be more complex. Ethnic or linguistic belonging has received much attention as a causal explanation for attitudinal differences in divided societies, including geopolitical orientations (Torres-Adan, 2021; see also O’Loughlin and Toal, 2022). Previous research makes it clear that there indeed are significant value differences in the Baltic states along ethno-lingual lines, the divide being particularly sharp with regards to perceptions of modern history understanding and geopolitical orientations (Duvold et al, 2020; Ekman, 2024). But is it really ethnicity and/or language that best explains these divisions or are there more complex patterns of orientations that only superficially can be understood in terms of ethno-lingual differences? Even if we know that geopolitical orientations – as well as threats and security perceptions – in the Baltic states tend to follow ethno-lingual divisions and that, by extension, public attitudes towards Russia, and, conversely, of the EU reflect attitudes to democracy both on the principle and performance levels (Easton 1965), we do not know have sufficient understanding of the demographic and attitudinal profiles of groups of people in the region advocating either closer ties with Russia or continued (or even closer) cooperation with the EU. Grasping these profiles is essential for understanding the social basis of geopolitical divisions and for evaluating the stability and direction of political alliances in the region. In the current study, we argue that ethno-lingual identity alone cannot adequately explain geopolitical orientations; suggesting that it serves more as a surface marker than a singular, underlying cause. Deviating from a simple variable-centred approach, this study, using Baltic Barometer data from 2021, employs cluster analysis to identity patterns and groupings of variables, which can categorise groups of individuals sharing similar characteristics and uncover nuances among and within different population groups (Bergman and Trost 2006). Our aim is to offer an open-ended, data-driven analysis of demographic characteristics and attitudinal patterns of distinct groups in the Baltic countries, thereby also contributing new empirical insights and demonstrating an alternative approach to political attitudes, including geopolitical orientations, in ethno-lingually divided societies. Despite the continuing relevance of ethno-linguistic belonging, our person-focused study demonstrates that other factors, such as socio-demographic position and a range of values and orientations linked to democracy and the political system, also matter