Choosing between alternative concepts in a worrisome world: Concern as a criterion

This paper addresses a central challenge in political science: how to choose between competing conceptions and structures of concepts. Existing approaches to concept validity offer useful criteria—such as resonance, consistency, differentiation, causal utility, and operationalization—but tend to omit criteria for evaluating the normative considerations that often underpin conceptual choices. As a result, conceptualization may face a fundamental indeterminacy when multiple conceptions appear equally well grounded. To address this lacuna, the paper introduces a Concern criterion, which evaluates concepts according to the extent to which they capture what is most worrisome in the political world. Building on the Semantic–Pragmatic approach to conceptualization, the paper argues that normative considerations can be disciplined rather than avoided. The argument is illustrated through the case of political polarization, where a shift from issue-based to affect-based conceptions reflects changing concerns about political division. The paper also examines the implications of the Concern criterion for structuring multidimensional concepts and addresses objections concerning objectivity, stability, and legitimacy. The paper concludes that a Concern criterion, while not sufficient on its own, provides a valuable complement to existing criteria and helps ground conceptual choices in a normatively informed yet methodologically disciplined manner.