People in the highly developed countries (to whom we will refer as Pn) have made life plans and pursue long-term projects on the basis that they will be able to emit at a high level into the future. Let us presuppose in ideal theory: (1) A justifiable global quota of emissions can be determined by relying on considerations of intergenerational justice, among others. (2) In determining a just distribution of the still permissible emissions we should be concerned about distributing the per capita benefits of engaging in emission-generating activities by distributing tradable emission rights. (3) Liberal egalitarian and non-egalitarian principles of distributive justice will demand at least equal per capita emission rights for all individuals and over their whole lifespan. Further we assume that the level at which Pn emit today and expect to be able to emit in the future is above the just per capita level of emissions. While these expectations are formed under a background condition of injustice they are often thought to be legitimate, which can be used to ground the claim that it is permissible to emit at the high levels associated with those expectations. This claim can be denied on the basis that by emitting more than they ought or would be permitted to under ideal circumstances these individuals wrongfully harm future people; to which an objection is that for several reasons as individuals they cannot be said to harm or wrongfully harm future people. In the paper we investigate the relevance and validity of this objection from the perspective of alternative accounts of non-ideal duties (of justice), in particular those of Peter Singer, Brad Hooker as well as Thomas Pogge and Liam Murphy.
