It seems plausible that simply participating in an unjust social structure makes an agent guilty of complicity. Complicity is one way to move from conclusions about structural injustice to individual moral responsibilities; those who are found to be complicit in a structural injustice can on that basis be assigned responsibility to act differently in future, and compensate those affected. However, Iris Young in her final book ‘Responsibility for Justice’ argues that assigning guilt in such cases is both inappropriate and unhelpful. Instead, Young develops a conception of responsibility for altering injustice without a conception of complicity in structural injustice. In my paper I examine the plausibility of Young’s rejection of guilt in cases of participation in structural injustice and consider Martha Nussbaum’s critique of Young’s position. In order to do this I compare moral responsibility for action with political responsibility for social structures. I explain how the nature of critiques of injustice, rather than immorality, make it difficult to isolate agents to hold responsible. I then analyse the practice of holding agents morally responsible for conduct and judge whether the aims and justifications of the practice are appropriate in the case of participants in unjust social structures. This leads me to conclude that holding agents accountable for complicity in structural injustice is appropriate only in very rare and specific circumstances. In most cases of structural injustice, those who participate without working towards reform are guilty of failing to fulfil their political duties, but not guilty of complicity.
