In this paper I explore some of the normative differences between domestic and transnational federalism in multinational settings. Federalism in multinational settings (such as in the EU, Canada, Spain or Belgium) very often is not simply an international meeting-ground for nations. Federalism is typically something in between a (non-federal) unitary domestic state and a (non-federal) international institutional structure. Citizens in federal constellations are simultaneously citizens of two peoples who each exercise sovereignty: a federal people and a sub-state people. However, federalism is a broad concept and particular normative theories of federalism will lean closer to the “Scylla” of confederalism and the “Charybdis” of unitarism. The first type of theories understand different nations in federal regimes to come together and to engage in some jointly agreed and mutually beneficial courses of action. The nations are the main actors. They select federal principles of justice to the extent that these can be in the national self-interest. The second type of theories normatively theorize federalism as a contract between the individuals joining the federal regime, not the peoples. Given these individuals’ differences in terms of nationality, a federal regime giving parti al political autonomy to the sub-federal nations is preferred over a unitary regime. I argue that the normative differences between both types of federalism are captured by, respectively, (proposals for) transnational federal orders (such as the EU) and multinational federal states (such as Canada, Spain or Belgium). In the latter, the existence of a federal nation over and above the nations of the sub-state units justifies the individualist normative focus. In contrast, it seems apt to characterize transnational federal orders as leaning more to the peoples-based model: identities are relatively mononational and institutions and the political process haven’t instilled strong-felt federal identities in citizens. In the paper, I also discuss federal hybrids, and I analyze how to normatively understand changes between the two distinguished types of federalism.
