The financial crisis has relentlessly revealed the deficient regulatory architecture of global financial markets. Initiated during the crisis, the debate on financial market (re-)regulation has been shaped by a constellation of various new and old – national, transnational and supranational – actors. Whereas many studies investigate the causes of the crisis, political science literature lacks a thorough understanding of the formation of regulatory decisions. Which of the regulatory reform proposals get implemented, why and by whom? Analyzing the reform process of rating agencies, hedge funds and derivatives at the level of the European Union, this paper systematically structures the actors involved, the proposals drawn upon and the content of the outcome. Based on reports, reform proposals, legislative initiatives and laws, structural factors in the reform process will be identified in order to develop different categories of reform types. These categories offer new insights about the functioning of the changed constellation of actors and the shifting of power resources. This study is theoretically underpinned by drawing upon existing literature in policy analysis and actor-centered institutionalism. The results will be verified through expert interviews. All cases are located within the field of securities markets, which so far have only attracted little scholarly interest. The selection follows the logic of the most-similar case study design. This paper contributes to the understanding of the unfolding reform process and its results may be applied to other regulatory areas.
