As the majority of European economic legislation impacts the operation of businesses, firms are increasingly forced to extend their lobbying activities to the European level. As a result, large individual firms have become influential political actors in Brussels over the last 20 years. Yet, after seven years of full membership, Eastern European corporations almost entirely remain outside of EU-level policy-making. This paper analyses under what conditions Eastern European firms engage in interest representation at the European level. It argues that the existing conditions for better access to EU institutions, together with the economical and political legacies of Eastern European countries, creates an institutional bias towards the economically stronger and established business interests in EU policy formulation. The explanation of this puzzle is developed on three levels. First it is argued that due to the lack of resources and experience, these corporations develop a course of rational ignorance and tend to act passively through associations, or reactively in case of economic threats. Second, the article demonstrates that the smaller size of Eastern European companies limits political influence in the common market; and third, it is investigated how state-firm relations and ownership structures impact upon the Europeanization of local Eastern European businesses. These factors contribute to the under-representation of Eastern European business interests on EU-level. A theoretical framework is developed, combining historical institutionalism with theories of institutional transitions. The framework is then applied to secondary data on interest representation and participation of Hungarian and Polish companies in the Commission’s public consultations, as well as interviews with key stakeholders in EU lobbying.
