Are diffuse interests destined to succumb to concentrated interests in the European Parliament (EP)? According to the popular view in the interest group literature, concentrated interests (such as businesses) are expected to prevail over diffuse interest (such as NGOs) in ‘entrepreneurial politics’. But is that also likely to happen in the EP, the European Union’s (EU) only directly elected institution, who is often depicted as a champion of the environment, consumers, and other ‘weak’ interests? This paper analyses whether or not businesses ‘win over’ NGOs in the EP on one particular piece of regulation: the regulation on the provision of food information to consumers. The analysis is based on the methods of process-tracing and interviews with Members of the EP (MEPs), EP officials, NGOs and business groups. The issue of food labelling has provoked much debate in the EU – and a major lobbying campaign, with the food and drink industry (such as Coca Cola and Ferrero Rocher) pitted against health and consumer organisations on just how much information consumers should be given. Several institutional factors suggest that, in the EU, diffuse interests are not destined to succumb to businesses. Many social, environmental, consumer and other public interests in Brussels receive their main source of funding from the EU budget. Although these arrangements may not fully prevent the possible dominance of special interests in the EU policy making process, they do facilitate the representation of diffuse interests in the process. However, only empirical research on legislation imposing costs on a specific sector of the economy to gain diffused benefits for the society proffer the litmus test of the capture hypothesis in the EP.
