The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which unfolded in the mid-1990s has not only been referred to as “Africa’s world war” (Prunier 2009) in which more than 5 million people have lost their lives since 1998, untold numbers became refugees and millions were injured, raped, and orphaned, but it has also provoked massive interventions by the international community. In this context, the EU has become one of the main actors in peace- and state building efforts: Despite the more traditional areas of development and humanitarian assistance, the EU has been deploying five civil and military missions since 2003 under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Clearly, if measured in terms of finances spent and political commitment, the DRC is of great importance to the EU.
Using implementation theory as the theoretical and conceptual framework and through the empirical investigation of policy formulation and implementation processes both in Brussels and in eastern DRC, the intention is to analyse to what extent and how these policies translate into outcomes and impact in the conflict environment of the Congo. Questions regarding the coordination and coherence within and between the different EU entities will be specifically emphasized. By doing so, the paper contributes to the general discussion on the EU’s role and actorness as a security provider based on its specific engagement in the DRC.
Previous research suggests so far, that in terms of actorness, the EU can be described rather as an institution wrangler than as a coherent actor (Lurweg 2011). Furthermore, and despite its huge commitment and broad range of activities, the EU seems to be more concerned with establishing a symbolic presence and a form of representation than with achieving specific goals in the conflict context of the DR Congo (Froitzheim et. al 2012).
