Since the mid-2000s, global climate policy-making has undergone significant transformations. The onset of two-track negotiations within the United Nations regime and the parallel emergence of arenas such as the Major Economies Forum, the G-8+5 or the G-20 have resulted in a global climate governance architecture of unprecedented complexity. While scholars are still trying to get a grip on these changes, reflected in attempts at “remapping global climate governance” (Pattberg/Stripple 2008) and untangling the global “regime complex for climate change” (Keohane/Victor 2010), parties to the global climate negotiations have no choice but to adapt to this new architecture as it evolves. This adaptation process has been very intricate, as the 2009 Copenhagen conference of the parties to the UNFCCC and its aftermath illustrated. The contribution parts from this observation by developing a concise understanding of the contemporary global climate governance architecture, before examining to what extent and how the structures of governance at the global level enable and constrain the climate policies of major powers: the US, the BASIC countries (especially China and India) and the EU. To do so, the paper will assess how and why these players’ positions, external and domestic approaches to global climate policy can(not) be realized - individually and collectively - in the institutional framework provided by the complex governance architecture. Shedding new light on the current impasse global climate politics find themselves in, the contribution raises crucial questions as to what the intended and unintended consequences of global climate governance structures mean for the realizability of a globally concerted solution to climate change. To conclude, the paper discusses possible alternatives to the aspiration of forging a comprehensive, legally binding global framework for climate change, notably regarding forms of genuinely multi-level climate governance.
