The constitutionalisation of the European Union encompasses much more than the latest round of treaty reform. Rather, it has been driven by the European Court of Justice since the earliest days of the integration project. The EC''s transformation from international organisation to sui generis entity with a federal-type legal structure was bold, ambitious, and – insofar as it was accomplished through judicial decision making – undemocratic. Yet, it was also highly successful. This contrasts with the EU’s unsuccessful attempt at explicit constitution making in the early 2000s, which was justified in large part by the perceived need to make the Union more democratic and legitimate. The Constitutional Treaty, through its flowery preamble and proclamation of nation-like symbols, espoused a vision of a coherent polity underpinned by a united citizenry. This was complemented by the promotion of legal centralization through articles such as the codification of Union legal supremacy. However, strengthening and centralizing the Union polity would not necessarily democratize it. In fact, the Constitutional Treaty''s failure and the subsequent promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty, is a victory for democracy in the EU. This paper focuses on the EU''s evolving constitutionalism and its implications for European democracy, particularly in light of the Lisbon Treaty''s reforms and surrounding jurisprudence. It argues that the prospects for democratic governance and the rule of law in Europe have been strenghtened through the reaffirmation of a non-hierarchical, pluralist conception of the relationship between national and European legal orders.
