When it comes to settling violent conflict both experts and practitioners still seem to be looking for the ingredients of the right formula. Mainstream rationalist and institutionalist approaches in conflict resolution focus on issues of balanced regulations, such as representation in government or material security that could guarantee acceptance and implementation of an agreement among the parties. Nevertheless, the role of non-tangible dimensions such as trust, fairness, or reciprocity has been so far underrated and rather understudied. Non-tangible factors primarily address needs and fear of a people and may well shape the agenda of the conflict parties in a different way than pragmatist rational and material concerns. Point of entry for this paper is the negotiation process aimed at ending violence and at finding a mutually satisfying settlement for the conflict parties. I employ examples from three “difficult”, protracted conflicts, those in Cyprus, in Nagorny-Karabakh, and in Kosovo, and illustrate moments of the processes that have led to a stalemate. I thereby conceptualize the style of conflict parties´ agendas as “backward-looking” or “forward-looking” in order to describe respectively a focus on memory and justice-seeking desire on the one hand, and on amnesty and settlement-seeking desire on the other. The argument goes that non-tangible factors may not only influence the willingness to make concessions, but also enhance or limit the ability to implement and sustain a peace agreement. Moreover, when a record of unfairness, distrust, and misrecognition sediment in collective memory, hostile identities become reified, conflict cleavages become rigid, and the risk of spoiling a future settlement rises.
