Various models of involvement in global injustices exist. Thomas Pogge, however, has urged that we understand failures to meet the basic needs of the global poor in terms of participation in collective negative duty violations. Pogge further argues that an adequate response to this fact would be to mitigate the effects of these violations according to the share of the duty one would have to bear were everyone else to do as they ought to. We argue in this paper that this is misleading. It fails to draw a relevant distinction between two ways in which one can be involved in collective negative duty violations, and so misdiagnoses what one owes as a result of that involvement. Ideas of contribution, like those that Pogge draws on, only have weight in situations of collective wrong, where there is an identifiable contribution an individual makes. In cases of corporate wrong, rather than contributing in some way, individual agents are complicit in the acts of corporate bodies they are members of whether they contributed to that wrong or contribution is in principle identifiable. This means that Pogge''s account of what we owe as a result of global injustices is wrong, failing to differentiate amongst different injustices and different relations different individuals stand in to them.
