The rise of independent regulatory agencies has brought an increasing share of policy-making that is carried out by institutions that are not elected, independent from elected politicians, and outside the chain of democratic delegation. These developments pose serious challenges for democratic accountability. However, empirical evidence on the accountability relations of agencies is still sparse. Despite the increasing role of new forms of accountability (e.g. by peer networks or user groups), recent attempts to evaluate the effect of new forms of governance conclude that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, i.e. ‘traditional’ accountability relations to government and parliament, still matters (Schillemans 2008, Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008, 2010, 2011). This paper investigates the effectiveness of this shadow from a comparative perspective. In addition to formal arrangements like independence, and rights for information and sanctioning, it argues, the actual probability of being hold to account that matters. This probability is determined foremost by two factors: First, by the resources (in terms of time, personnel, and expertise) the overseeing bodies have at hand. They affect the capabilities of an overseeing body to gather and process sufficient information. Second, by the internal structure of the overseeing, e.g. its nomination and decision-making rules: A strong representation of parliamentary opposition in a body maybe makes a sanctioning decision more likely, while rules requesting a qualified majority reduce the probability of sanctions. Agencies are expected to anticipate the likeliness of being hold to account and limitate their actions accordingly (Noll, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989). It is expected that this process of auto-limitation enhances the extent of control executives and legislatures are able to exercise. The argument is tested empirically by evaluating the resources and structures of agency boards and parliamentary committees, representing in most cases the most prominent accountability instruments executives and legislatures have at disposal, and by using recent survey data from European Agencies for finance, broadcasting, and telecommunications regulation is used.
