The Political Economy of International Institutions

This section addresses timely issues related to the political economy of international institutions. We are interested in papers that advance our understanding of formal international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and trade agreements. Moreover, we aim to attract papers that explore informal and hybrid institutional arrangements formed by diverse configurations of state and non-state actors, such as informal groups of states and public-private governance schemes. We are soliciting papers that explore topics related to the political economy of international institutions broadly understood. We are particularly interested in submissions oriented toward three directions: (1) the analysis of the emergence, design, and evolution of international institutions; (2) the investigation of the governance dynamics within and between international institutions as well as between international and domestic institutions; (3) the intended and unintended effects of international institutions on governance outcomes. We encourage a multi-method approach to the study of international institutions that combines different methods of data collection and analysis to generate and test hypotheses about the emergence, dynamics, and effects of international institutions in world politics. We welcome papers that use game-theoretic approaches and econometric analyses as well as papers that employ qualitative methods. Papers that combine the development of innovative theoretical models with rigorous empirical tests using original data are especially welcome.