Democracy and Technocracy: Cooperation and Competition in the Governance of National and Suprantional Systems

That technocratic elements would play a significant role in the governance of advanced industrialized countries had been envisaged nearly two centuries ago by Saint Simon and Comte. In more recent times the rise and diffusion of democratic regimes and of party government have sometimes induced views that overlook the role played by technocratic norms, institutions, and elites within democratic regimes. The increasing autonomy of central banks, the proliferation of Independent Authorities, the recruitment of "expert" ministers in many crucial government positions and the decline of party government suggest the need to observe more systematically at the empirical level the role of technocracy in democratic regimes, to develop more articulate theoretical frameworks for interpreting and explaining the phenomenon, and also to discuss more openly the normative implications of these developments. A special attention should be devoted to the relevance of this phenomenon within the framework of the political system of the European Union in view also of the weaker weight of standard democratic mechanisms in a suprantional setting. In fact the dilemmas of democracy and technocracy have been the object of a lively debate focusing on the "democratic deficit" in the EU. In some ways when analyzing the role of technocracy in "norma" political systems the discussion which has developed within the field of European studies can provide useful suggestions. The questions on the table are multiple. Who are the technocrats? What are the drivers of technocrats' behaviour? How do technocratic institutions work? Which mechanisms of accountability can be applied to technocratic institutions? What are or can be the dynamics between technocrats and democratic /partisan personnel when they operate within the same institution (such as a cabinet)? What can democratic systems gain/lose when combined with technocratic elements?