Leadership in the European Radical Left

The European radical left, and associated political science and sociological fields such as left populism, are emerging areas of interest amongst European academics, analysts and policy makers, bolstered by the emergence of newer anti-austerity and left-populist forces such as Syriza (Greece), Podemos (Spain) and La France Insoumise, as well as the continued prevelance of the more established (and not necessarily populist) radical left - parties such as AKEL (Cyprus), The Left-Green Movement (Iceland), die Linke (Germany), and many others. The extant literature (e.g March 2011, Hudson 2012, Ramiro 2016, March and Keith 2016, Chiocchetti 2017, Katsembekis and Kioupkiolis forthcoming), has tended to focus on questions of party profile (ideology/strategy), membership, electoral and governmental performance, and policy impact. There is an emergent literature focussing more explicitly on radical left party organisation (e.g. Tsakatika and Lisi 2013, Charalambous and Lamprianou 2016) which is however as yet under-developed. Whilst the study of party leadership per se is relatively rudimentary, fewer sources still focus on radical left party leadership (although see Tsakatika, forthcoming). However, this topic is of increasing importance and interest. Certain radical left leaders, such as Alexis Tsipras (Syriza) and Pablo Iglesias (Podemos) have both headed popular parties and gained support and notoriety beyond their national borders; many radical left leaders have become important figures in their national contexts, in some cases assuming the leadership of their country (Tsipras, Christophias, Voronin) and in other cases leading their party into national government coalitions; others still have been vital agents in the political success (or conversely, political cataclysm) and transformation of their respective parties. In some cases (Melanchon, Marijnissen) radical left party leaders have been compared to far right populist leaders in their countries. In this context, it is worth noting how diverse the radical left party family is in terms of leadership function and style, with rotating leadership, collective leadership as well as virtual leaders-for-life; gender-balanced and feminised organisations co-existing with rather ‘macho’ male-dominated leaderships. The radical left thus makes a good party family to examine, with the over-riding question of: is there anything distinctive about radical left party leadership function, style and communication relative to other party families? The topic will allow for interesting comparative analyses from across Europe. We are particularly interested in three major aspects of radical left party leadership: 1) Leadership as a function of party organisation. Biographical studies of pre-1989 radical left party leaders have stressed the strong grip that the latter have exercised upon their party organisations and the extent to which they have fostered or countered the centralisation of power. Little insight is on the contrary available on the impact of contemporary RLP leadership on their parties’ internal organisation. Previous studies have touched upon party organisational linkages with members, supporters and external organisations. However, few studies, particularly on a comparative basis, have focussed on the role that leadership plays in party linkages and in the maintenance of organisational and factional equilibria. 2) Leadership and gender. There are few studies of the radical left and gender (although see Keith and Verge 2016). Formally speaking, the radical left is a very gender-conscious party family, with commitments to feminism and 50:50 gender quotas for candidate and leadership positions widespread. However, these commitments are regularly informally flouted, with many parties (particularly the ‘old left’) being male dominated. Nor has the radical left been immune to scandals relating to harassment or exploitation. We would argue that claims to ‘strive for a society, which transgresses the capitalist and patriarchal logic’ (Party of the European Left, 2019), need to be analysed, not taken at face value. 3) Leadership and political communication. It used to be said that there was a very distinct form of communist leadership, sometimes dubbed ‘non-charismatic personalism’ (Ansell and Fish 2002), whereby (male) communist leaders acted primarily as arbitrators within the party bureaucracy rather than figures who courted wider electoral popularity. Such leaders represented the distinctly bureaucratic apparatchik style of ‘comrade card-index’ as was Stalin’s one-time nickname. In the post-communist era, it is less evident that there is a distinct ‘radical left’ leadership style. Radical left leaders have become increasingly office and vote-seeking, increasingly telegenic and focussed on (new) media communication, and less obviously simply the ciphers of the party bureaucracy (March 2008). Indeed, left-populist leaders are regularly regarded as charismatic (a term which is inexact and now increasingly contested within the populist literature itself [e.g. Pappas 2016]). Our focus is on what (if anything) is still distinct about radical left party leadership political communication? What explains national variations? Is left-populist leadership itself especially distinct? We welcome approaches to the above questions, particularly those that have a comparative perspective. Theoretically-informed case studies are also welcome, particularly those which analyse lesser-known national cases, in both Western and Eastern Europe.