Judicial power under legislative and executive threats

Abstract

It is well established that courts adjudicate the law but need to rely on the executive to enforce it. However, executives in the US, Hungary, and Poland have come to publicly attack the judiciary and curtail judicial independence through legal reforms and court-packing. Once judges have lost their independence, they can support unconstitutional reforms and aid the consolidation of authoritarian power. This panel looks at how courts maintain their power in an era of democratic backsliding, what tactics legislative and executive powers use to undermine courts’ performance, and what tools courts have to counteract these threats.

Title	Details
Judicial Aggrandizement and Democratic Backsliding	View Paper Details
When do the politicians “attack” the courts? Evidence from a Large-Scale Comparative Analysis	View Paper Details
Resistance by association? (Un)successful pathways to maintaining judicial independence in Hungary and Poland	View Paper Details
Mapping Attacks on Courts and the European Union’s Protection of the Rule of Law in Hungary and Poland	View Paper Details