The bureaucratic politics of regulatory performance

Abstract

This panel addresses several important and interrelated aspects of organizational performance in general and regulatory performance more specifically spanning across countries and policy sectors. The contributions to the panel examine different aspects of agency performance which move beyond a narrow understanding of performance as goal achievement. Some of the papers aim at explaining agency performance (broadly defined) as a function of formal and actual agency autonomy, stakeholders’ trust and distrust in regulatory regimes, or capacity loss due to policy accumulation. Another set of papers focuses on the preconditions for regulatory performance, by addressing learning processes and task prioritization under changing conditions of technology regulation, as well as defensive mechanisms of protecting agency decisions from (potentially harmful) political interference.

Title	Details
Organizing attention in regulatory agencies: the case of regulating technology	View Paper Details
Who needs AIR? Regulatory Impact Analysis as a strategic shield of bureaucratic protection against political interferences	View Paper Details
Does it matter whom you trust? Studying the impact of trust and distrust in public and private actors within regulatory regimes on the performance of those regimes	View Paper Details
Assessing the Democratic Deficit of Regulatory Authorities: A Cross-country and Cross-sector Comparative Perspective	View Paper Details
Comparing policy accumulation induced capacity loss in public sector organizations	View Paper Details