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Who needs AIR? Regulatory Impact Analysis as a strategic shield of bureaucratic protection against political interferences

Regulation
Developing World Politics
Comparative Perspective
Erico Santos
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Carlos Pereira
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Erico Santos
Getulio Vargas Foundation

Abstract

All governments, regardless of their political or ideological flavor, face a crucial dilemma between independence and control of regulatory agencies. This dilemma is particularly relevant when there is an alternation of power with the arrival of a new political elite with preferences different from those of the predecessor government. The main objective of the research was the development of an experimental analysis in order to explore the hypothesis that Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) could be perceived by public servants of the agencies as a tool to protect their interests against the risk of potential external interference in its activities, in particular the government. The methodological strategy adopted was to apply an experimental survey with the agencies’ career servants. The randomized experiment had two treatment groups (with and without a manipulation of political interference) and a control group (no manipulation). A total of 104 questionnaire responses were received from six regulatory agencies in Brazil. The survey results reveal that, despite the mandatory nature of the AIR, when civil servants perceive that the regulatory agency would be under threat of executive interference, civil servants use it as a mechanism to protect their preferences. The overwhelming majority of respondents were in favor of using the RIA and see this instrument as a shield against potential external interference in the performance of the agencies, especially with regard to the risks of non-continuity of the terms in office of directors appointed by previous governments.