The Politics of Bureaucratic Reputation

Abstract

Bureaucratic reputation scholarship has demonstrated that bureaucratic organizations adjust decision-making practices, produce diverse outputs, and engage in targeted communication strategies to build, maintain, or enhance their reputation. In other words, reputational considerations have been found to affect bureaucracies’ behavior, processes and outputs in important ways. However, we still have a limited understanding of the effects of these efforts and the conditions under which bureaucratic actors succeed (or fail) in cultivating their regulatory power, autonomy, authority and/or engender citizen trust. To what extent are public organizations successful in cultivating support from their audiences? This panel invites theoretical and empirical contributions on the politics of bureaucratic reputation. It invites especially empirical contributions that set out to test core claims of reputation literature.

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