Expert Reputation, Communication Style, and Democratic Deliberation (for panel on Politics of Bureaucratic Reputation).

Government agencies that depend on reputations for scientific expertise (i.e., expert agencies) might communicate uncertainty to citizens, and this may impact citizens’ engagement in democratic deliberations about public policies. Such engagement may in turn be important for democratic legitimacy and quality of decisions. A strong public reputation for scientific expertise, that is, a widely-held public belief that the agency is scientifically expert in its policy area, could encourage or discourage deliberation (a weak reputation would have the reverse effect). Which effect a reputation has on deliberation may depend on the relative power of two alternative styles of communication that agencies adopt. One style is to present advice as knowledge. Public science communication emphasizing uncertainty often results in negative effects, so communicators should be cautious, especially about expressing consensus uncertainty. Hence, agencies take a risk when communicating uncertainty. Admitting uncertainties with communication styles that invite to dialogue, instead of primarily signaling the agency’s unique capacities and niche monopolies, may back-fire on the agency’s trust, with negative effect on its reputation for competence. A second and alternative style is transparency about the state of knowledge. There are several reasons to be transparent about uncertainty and be open to discussions with audiences. Uncertainty is commonly the actual knowledge situation which makes authorities communicating certainty in a simplified way more exposed to the risk of being proven wrong. Properly framed, inviting an audience to dialogue with a willingness to defend and explain the knowledge communicated may also signal self-confidence and professionalism instead of hesitancy. Given agency reputations for scientific expertise, what effect may such alternative communication styles have on public deliberation? Presenting advice as knowledge could steer citizens toward deliberating when reputations are weak, and away from deliberating when reputations are strong. An agency with a strong reputation for scientific knowledge is likely to be believed if it claims to know something. In turn, citizens receiving advice from this agency are unlikely to want to deliberate further about what to do because they believe that simply following the agency’s advice is the best available course of action. Conversely, an agency with a weak reputation for scientific knowledge is unlikely to be believed if it claims to know something. In turn, citizens receiving advice from that agency will be sceptical, and either ignore what it asks for or engage in deliberations about the best course of action. Presenting advice as an iteration based on current understanding could steer citizens away from deliberating when reputations are weak, and toward deliberating when reputations are strong. An agency with a strong scientific reputation can encourage citizens to reason about and discuss public policy because the agency’s inputs into thinking and reasoning are respected and believed. Conversely, an agency with a weak reputation is less able to encourage deliberation because citizens will tend not to respect its inputs or make use of them.