In person icon Fixing the Bench

Abstract

A global perspective on court-reform over the last four decades reveals an interesting picture. Court-reform can look like fixing a game, fixing a machine, or simply like fixing dinner. In other words, court reform is a chameleon in that it can look like several things. We have seen regimes engage in “fixing” the governance game in their favour by engaging in a host of techniques including court-rigging, court-capture through court-packing, court-curbing, establishing new courts entirely staffed with new judges, and court-stacking. On the other hand, we have seen countries engage in genuine attempts to “fix” judicial benches for a whole host of other reasons related to improving or repairing judiciaries which are not functioning in line with the demands of the society. In this regard, discussions have popped up regarding so-called “good” court-packing, as well as court-unpacking to undo abusive techniques of gaining control of the judiciary or even to fix hyper-partisan benches. Some discussions even see democratic frontsliding, which rebuilds space for democracy, through “fixing” in this sense. Finally, fixing dinner appears as less politically salient. This type of fixing the courts may often pop up in discussions of broader judicial reforms, judicial cultures, or expectations from future judges’ profiles, experience, and moral and professional skills. It is typically present in countries and judiciaries in transition. While fixing the bench has a primarily negative connotation, it cannot be easily classifiable into one archetype of “fixing.” In some scenarios, such as democratic transitions from totalitarianism or authoritarianism, adding judges to the supreme court can be perfectly legitimate. On the other hand, gaming composition of the bench by dismissing sitting judges appointed by democratic opposition and installing loyal allies on the bench falls into the category of “bad” fixing. In other words, court packing may act in different scenarios like different versions of “fixing”—for good, for bad, or for neutral reasons. The proliferation of court-packing wars has recently stirred up a lot of controversy. Yet, the 2023 Polish election showed the urgency behind a new vexing question: what to do with packed courts once the political actors who staffed them lose power? (How) Can courts be legitimately unpacked? Should the content of decision-making, judicial behaviour or the personal independence of packed judges be considered? Addressing these questions, this panel analyses the normative underpinnings of unpacking in the context of global examples of court-packing.

Title	Details
How Do Populist Governments Legitimize Their Court-Curbing Policies? Evidence from Turkey	View Paper Details
Judicial Reform, Judicial Elections, and the Institutional Legitimacy of the Courts in Mexico	View Paper Details
Packing Courts Seriously: the 2024 Mexican Judicial Overhaul and the Transitional Challenges of Future Unpacking	View Paper Details
JUDICIAL OVERSTAY AND THE WALKING STICK AMENDMENT - Revoking Judicial Appointment Powers in Brazil	View Paper Details
Unpacking the Courts: Preliminary Inquiry	View Paper Details