The Political Theory and Ethics of (Resisting) Electoral Autocracies

Abstract

This panel addresses theoretical and applied issues in the normative political theory and ethics of electoral autocracies and resistance to electoral autocratic regimes. While comparative political science has dedicated much attention to the study of electoral autocracies (Møller & Skaaning 2024), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006, 2013), and hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002, Morlino 2022), normative political theory has offered very limited reflection on this (family of) regime type(s), including Isiksel & Pepinsky 2025, Jubb 2024, Kirshner 2018, 2022, Miklosi 2026, Schedler 2013, Scheppele 2018, Szűcs 2023. Core normative concepts—such as political obligation, authority, legitimacy—and core problems in political ethics—such as civil disobedience, electoral participation—have been theorized in contemporary normative political theory overwhelmingly by reflection on liberal democratic contexts. To what extent and how should we rethink the concepts, problems, and principles of both institutional normative theory and the ethics of political action once we shift our attention to electoral autocracies? This panel contributes to answering this question by focusing on three sets of interrelated questions, as well as exploring what political theory can learn from the latest empirical findings on electoral authoritarianism: 1. How should we rethink classical core concepts in normative political theory such as political obligation, authority, and legitimacy for electoral autocracies? Is there political obligation in electoral autocracies, do they have authority and/or legitimacy? If so, how should we conceptualize these, and what are their normative grounds in this regime context? If not, how can these concepts be nonetheless relevant for the political theory of and ethics of political action in electoral autocracies? 2. Which normative grounds, beyond the norms of interpersonal morality, should guide political action in electoral autocracies? Are there specifically political values or principles at all that guide political action in electoral autocracies? If so, to what extent are they similar to or different from the values and principles that guide political action in liberal democracies? 3. Which political principles are relevant to the applied ethics of electoral and non-electoral political action in electoral autocracies, such as standing for, voting in, or boycotting elections, as well as protest, disobedience, and various forms of resistance? How should we rethink the ethics of electoral participation if elections serve different—and in part, morally objectionable—functions in electoral autocracies than in liberal democracies? How should we theorize the ethics of civil disobedience and resistance without assuming liberal or democratic legitimacy?

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