Beyond Abstention: The Functions of Election Boycotts in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

What roles do election boycotts play in sustaining opposition in competitive authoritarian regimes? Election boycotts—situations where political parties or candidates actively refrain from contesting an election—are typically evaluated based on whether they secure concessions or propel democratization. Because election boycotts rarely achieve those ends, they are often dismissed as ineffective, counterproductive, or simply “a bad idea.” We challenge this view. Adopting a functional perspective, we develop a conceptual typology that distinguishes between expressive and instrumental boycott functions, on the one hand, and opposition-focused and regime-focused functions, on the other. Drawing on a review of all election boycotts between 1945 and 2024, we identify and illustrate the many distinct roles that election boycotts can play, such as delegitimizing the regime, displacing political competition into the ruling coalition, accentuating regime unpopularity, and protecting opposition leaders and supporters. By shifting attention from success or failure toward the multiple roles boycotts can play, and by specifying the conditions under which they can fulfill those roles, we contribute new knowledge on the role of opposition actors in competitive authoritarian regimes. Co-authors: Sebastian van Baalen, Jesper Bjarnesen, Gudlaug Olafsdottir, Tobias Gustafsson, Arthur Frantz