Interest Group Access & Bureaucratic Governance

Abstract

These papers collectively examine the conditions under which interest groups gain access. The papers converge on the idea that access is structured by variation across organizations, institutional venues, and stages of the policy process. Several contributions demonstrate that bias and selectivity in interest representation cannot be assessed at a single level or moment. Second, the role of knowledge and expertise emerges as a unifying analytical lens. Across the studies, access is closely tied to the capacity to produce, format, and translate knowledge in ways that align with political and bureaucratic expectations. From the European Commission’s call for evidence mechanism to the European Semester’s epistemic hierarchies, interest representation hinges on actors’ ability to engage in evidence production and policy relevant framing. Third, several papers emphasize agency within constraints. While institutions and organizational practices clearly structure participation, interest groups and officials are not portrayed as passive rule followers. Instead, they navigate, interpret, and sometimes reshape consultative practices through micro-level interactions, social relations, and strategic adaptations.

Title	Details
Mobilization Bias Versus Access Bias: Comparing Interest Group Populations with Access to Political Institutions Across Multiple Levels	View Paper Details
Agency of National Social Interest Groups in EU Multilevel Governance: The Case of the European Semester	View Paper Details
Interest Groups, Bureaucrats and Access to the European Commission: Evidence from Network Models	View Paper Details
Interest Groups and the EU ‘Call for Evidence’ Mechanism: Policy Discourse or Much Ado About Nothing?	View Paper Details
Rethinking Bureaucratic Routines for Collaborative Work: Organizational Cues for Stakeholder Engagement	View Paper Details