Interest Groups and the EU ‘Call for Evidence’ Mechanism: Policy Discourse or Much Ado About Nothing?

How do normative adjustments of the EU decision-making process affect the forms of interest representation and the effective advocacy capacities of interest groups (IG)? Do interest groups’ mobilisation at specific stages of the EU decision-making process produce knowledge and power? To what extent do the capabilities offered for interests articulation institutionalise the forms of this mobilisation (e.g., by producing norms, affecting IG capabilities, agendas, interests, networking, etc.)? Our research contributes to this broader conceptual debate. It does so by examining the impact of the ‘call for evidence’ (CfE) mechanism introduced in 2015 - streamlined in 2017 - as part of the European Commission’s “Better Regulation Agenda”. CfE allows stakeholders and the public to provide input at an early stage of policy development, before formal proposals are drafted. The research focuses on how this mechanism shapes interest advocacy, as well as on whether it transforms participating IG into knowledge producers. The hypothesis is that CfE shifts IG action upstream. This re-weights advocacy capacity away from classic “inside lobbying” on amendments towards (a) anticipatory agenda work, to define the problem, frame the urgency, and narrow the menu of “thinkable” options; (b) knowledge formatting, to produce evidence in the forms the Commission can absorb (quantification, impact narratives, feasibility constraints, “what works” claims) and (c) coalition and networking signalling, as demonstrating breadth of support early, can shape the Commission’s perceptions on policy inititatives. These adjustments affect forms of representation by privileging actors who can translate interests into policy-relevant knowledge objects (data, scenarios, “evidence-based” framings), rather than trade support later in the legislative process. The case study is the 2025 CfE for developing a ‘new industrial maritime strategy’, part of the European Ocean Pact, which in turn is a flagship strategy of the Competitiveness Compass. The data will be gathered primarily through analysis and comparison of documents, using discourse analysis. Interviews with mobilised maritime interest groups will be a supplementary resource. The research maps the IG that have been mobilised in response to the European Commission’s call, and compares their input with the expressed policy strategy (expected in early 2026). Beyond this mapping, a network analysis will generate information on the linkages among contributors who contribute to the CEF. Comparing the contributions of organised stakeholders to the CfE of 2025 with the European Commission’s strategy (expected in early 2026) will help clarify the extent to which CfE is a critical mechanism for generating ideas that later serve as the foundations of new policy strategies. It will also help discuss the broader role of knowledge production in decision-making through interest-group mobilisation. In essence, the research examines the significance of, and on, interests articulation during the CfE in setting agendas, and/or shaping policy responses and related decisions. It thus provides evidence on the functioning of current EU policy-making methods.