Kant’s Two Justifications for Democracy

Abstract

Speaker: Michael Kryluk, University of Fribourg Is democracy the best—or, less ambitiously, the least bad—form of government? Political philosophers and theorists who answer this question in the affirmative fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, intrinsic justifications of democracy claim that democracy expresses or instantiates important values (e.g., freedom, equality) that other forms of government do not. On the other hand, instrumental justifications of democracy hold that democracy simply yields better outcomes (e.g. better policies, economic prosperity) that non-democracies may also achieve, albeit less optimally. While Kant’s views on democracy are highly contested, in this presentation I will argue that he merits attention for offering robust versions of both the intrinsic and the instrumental justification for democracy. Kant’s version of the second claim is familiar: according to the ‘democratic peace thesis’ attributed to Kant, democracy is best suited to bring about a lawful and pacific international order, which is itself a key stage in the moral perfection of humanity. In terms of the first, less familiar claim, I will highlight Kant’s argument in Section 52 of the Doctrine of Right that only a representative democracy can render right peremptory at the level of the nation-state in accordance with the innate right to freedom. Non-democracies are, by contrast, only provisionally rightful, that is, rightful in anticipation of a democratic republic. I will then conclude by offering some early thoughts on the relationship between Kant’s two justifications for democracy.