Kant’s Ideal Republic and the (Non-) Instrumentality of Democracy

Abstract

Speaker: Michael Kryluk, University of Fribourg The aim of this essay is to highlight Kant’s two primary formulations of the ideal republic and their relationship to the contemporary debate about the value of democracy. Although the theme of the perfect republic is a constant presence in Kant’s thought, the topic has received far less attention than other forms of ideal moral and political association in his work—e.g. the kingdom of ends, the ethical commonwealth. To remedy this neglect, this paper compares the distinctive roles of Kant’s model polity in his philosophy of history and political philosophy. In terms of the former, Kant assigns an instrumental value to the ideal state—i.e. a state defined by the maximum of reciprocally lawful freedom for each (A 316/B 372–73; AA 8:22)—by framing it as a means for the achievement of nature’s 'highest end' for humanity, namely, our moral development as a species. Later writings ('Perpetual Peace', The Conflict of the Faculties, the published Anthropology) extend this line of argument to the republican and potentially democratic dimensions of the ideal polity. This suggests an instrumental conception of democracy, according to which the value of democratic self-legislation consists in its contribution to the fulfillment of a superordinate end, humanity’s moral perfection. By contrast, the Doctrine of Right offers a non-instrumental conception of the state as an intrinsically valuable requirement of rightful freedom. Some commentators (e.g. Ripstein, Rostbøll) have used Kant’s position as the basis for a non-instrumental justification of democracy. On this view, democratic self-governance is independently valuable without reference to a further end. Accordingly, Kant’s idea of the 'pure republic' (AA 6:340)—i.e. a fully self-legislating state, in which freedom is the sole condition of coercion—specifies a norm of governance that possesses an inherent worth absent from non-democratic state forms. After differentiating Kant’s two versions of the ideal republic, I close by considering a potential point of tension: revolution. By categorically prohibiting revolution, Kant cuts off a stance taken by many of his early followers (e.g. Fichte, F. Schlegel), i.e., that the merely instrumental value of a morally imperfectly democracy justifies its violent transformation on ethical grounds.