Co-optation and Autocratic Regime Stability. Conceptual, Theoretical and Empirical Approaches

Abstract

One of the main pillars of stability of autocratic regimes seems to be co-optation. We understand co-optation as the capacity of the ruling elite to bind strategic actors, be they from the ranks of military, the business elites or from other fields, to the regime. Recent research has demonstrated that co-optation can be achieved via formal institutions, e.g. in terms of (parliamentary) policy concessions, or via informal institutions, e.g. by relying on personalist networks and corruption. By doing so, potential oppositional movements can be undermined and the threat of overthrow can be thwarted, although one should keep in mind that co-optation may be a costly endeavor. We propose a panel that has a closer look on both the correlation between the capacity of co-optation and regime stability as well as the underlying working mechanisms. We invite papers that focus on the conceptual side of co-optation and thereby open avenues for future (comparative) research.Furthermore, we are also particularly interested in innovative papers that find new solutions to the obvious measurement problem of a fuzzy concept like co-optation.

Title	Details
Generating Stability by Generating Conflict? Co-optation and its Functioning in the Egyptian Parliament	View Paper Details
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Co-optation and Autocratic Regime Stability: Evidence from Zambia and Uganda	View Paper Details
Co-optation as a Strategy of Authoritarian Legitimation – Success and Failure in the Arab World	View Paper Details
Co-opting the Enemy, Capturing the State: The Use of Capital and Coercion in the State-Building Processes of Azerbaijan and Armenia	View Paper Details