How and by what means are alternative power holders that challenge the state co-opted and incorporated into the state? The aim of this paper is two-fold: to analyze the micro-processes of state-building in post-Soviet states and to investigate how alternative power holders that challenge the state are co-opted and incorporated into state structures. I qualify my theoretical contribution by stating that it is situated in the former Soviet Union and, in line with scholars like Valerie Bunce, I argue that this makes the transition of these states quite distinct and different from previous transitions. The story of how alternative power holders rose out of Soviet and later post-Soviet states is a product of the Soviet system which necessarily differentiates the initial starting point and the content of the transitions. The study will focus on a comparison of Azerbaijan and Armenia, two states that were engaged in war over the territory of Nagorno Karabakh – a region legally belonging to Azerbaijan but with a predominantly Armenian population. I will analyze the state capture strategies of the different actors involved in the war (for instance state troops, volunteer militias, self-defense units, part-time fighters, mercenary groups etc.) and try to assess how they were incorporated into the state. I will argue that the coercion and capital at the disposal of elites and counter-elites (the alternative power holders) has decisive effects on who will control the state and how the other group will be co-opted. Azerbaijan and Armenia make two interesting case studies because they both transitioned from the same system (the Soviet state) but fought on different sides in a war. Different groups acquired power in each case and the underlying reasons behind this should be analyzed to contribute to the literature on state-building and state-centralization (in other words, co-optation of alternative power contenders).
